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A particular genetic lineage of foot-and-mouth disease
virus (FMDV) serotype O, which we have named the
PanAsia strain, was responsible for an explosive pandem-
ic in Asia and extended to parts of Africa and Europe from
1998 to 2001. In 2000 and 2001, this virus strain caused
outbreaks in the Republic of Korea, Japan, Russia,
Mongolia, South Africa, the United Kingdom, Republic of
Ireland, France, and the Netherlands, countries which last
experienced FMD outbreaks decades before (ranging from
1934 for Korea to 1984 for the Netherlands). Although the
virus has been controlled in all of these normally FMD-free
or sporadically infected countries, it appears to be estab-
lished throughout much of southern Asia, with geographi-
cally separated lineages evolving independently. A
pandemic such as this is a rare phenomenon but demon-
strates the ability of newly emerging FMDV strains to
spread rapidly throughout a wide region and invade coun-
tries previously free from the disease.
F
oot-and-mouth disease virus (FMDV, family
Picornaviridae, genus Aphthovirus) causes an acute
vesicular disease of pigs and wild and domesticated rumi-
nants such as cattle, water buffalo, sheep, goats, and deer
(1). It can cause high death rates in young animals and pro-
duction losses in adults and is considered to be the single
most important constraint to world trade in live animals
and animal products. Spread of FMDV is predominantly
associated with the legal and illegal movement of infected
animals or their products.
The Food and Agriculture Organization World
Reference Laboratory for Foot-and-Mouth Disease
(WRLFMD) is established within the high-security labora-
tory at the Institute for Animal Health, Pirbright, United
Kingdom (2). From 2000 to 2004, WRLFMD received an
annual average of 536 samples to diagnose FMD from
regions of the world where the disease is endemic, pre-
dominantly Africa and Asia. Seven serotypes of FMDV
exist: SAT 1, SAT 2, and SAT 3 are usually restricted to
Africa; Asia 1 is restricted to Asia; and O, A, and C are
present in Africa, Asia, and South America and occasion-
ally Europe. In each of the last 5 years, serotype O has
been isolated from >60% of the positive FMD samples
received.
The economic consequences of FMD incursion into
disease-free regions may be severe. For instance, in the
first 3 months of the 1997 outbreak in Taiwan, >6,000
farms were affected, 4 million pigs were destroyed or died
from the disease, and >21 million doses of vaccine were
used (3). The cost of controlling the disease was estimated
at US $378.6 million. An additional $1.6 billion was lost in
export trade, and >65,000 jobs in pig farming and associ-
ated industries were lost (3). To control the FMD outbreak
without using vaccination, animals were slaughtered on
>10,000 farms in the United Kingdom in 2001; only one
fifth of these animals were actually infected. Four million
animals were slaughtered for control measures and 2.5
million more for animal health reasons (4). The direct and
indirect losses were estimated at ≈£8 billion (5).
FMDV has a genome consisting of a single strand of
positive-sense RNA. Consequently, the virus has a high
mutation rate and may change, on a random basis, 1–8
nucleotides (nt) per replication cycle (6). Nucleotide
sequencing of part or all of the genome region coding for
the outer capsid polypeptide VP1 was first used to study
the epidemiology of FMD by Beck and Strohmaier (7),
who investigated the origin of outbreaks of types O and A
in Europe over a 20-year period. Since then, genetic vari-
ability has been used to individually characterize strains of
FMDV and track their movement across international bor-
ders (8), and a large number of epidemiologic studies have
been published (9). Previously, on the basis of compar-
isons of partial VP1 sequences (≈170 nt at the 3′ end of the
gene) of FMD type O viruses, differences between 2 iso-
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common origin, whereas differences of >15% signify geo-
graphic isolation over many years (10), similar to the dis-
tinctions made between human polioviruses (11). Isolates
with >85% nt sequence identity have been placed within
groups or topotypes, which tend to be restricted in their
geographic distribution (10,12). The 10 topotypes have
been named Europe-South America (Euro-SA), Middle
East–South Asia (ME-SA), Southeast Asia (SEA), Cathay
(CHY), West Africa (WA), East Africa 1 (EA-1), East
Africa 2 (EA-2), East Africa 3 (EA-3), Indonesia-1 (ISA-
1), and Indonesia-2 (ISA-2). The Indonesian topotypes,
which have not been identified since 1983, are considered
extinct.
Knowles et al. (13) described the emergence and spread
of the PanAsia strain from 1990 to 2000 on the basis of
comparisons of partial (and some complete) VP1
sequences from 60 virus isolates. This article extends the
molecular epidemiology of this virus strain by comparing
188 complete VP1 sequences for FMD type O viruses
mostly isolated from 2000 to 2005 with published
sequences of selected viruses from the previous decade
and some reference virus strains (N = 151).
Materials and Methods
Viruses and Primers
The designation and origin of FMDV isolates studied
are listed in online Appendix 1 (available from http://www.
cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol11no12/05-0908_app1.htm).
Three alternative primer combinations were used for
reverse transcription–polymerase chain reaction (RT-
PCR): O-1C244F/NK61, O-1C272F/NK61, and O-
1C283F/NK61, which have amplicon sizes of 1,181,
1,153, and 1,142 bp, respectively (Table). Forward and
reverse primer amounts were 20 and 40 pmol, respective-
ly. We used 4–6 internal sequencing primers to ensure cov-
erage of the VP1 region on both DNA strands (Table).
RT-PCR of vRNA
Total RNA was extracted from 460 µL of a 10% epithe-
lial suspension or cell culture supernatant by using RNeasy
kits (Qiagen Ltd., Crawley, West Sussex, UK), according to
the manufacturer’s instructions, and resuspended in 50 µL
nuclease-free water. This RNA(5 µL) was used as the tem-
plate in a 1-step RT-PCR (Ready-To-Go RT-PCR Beads;
Amersham Pharmacia Biosciences, Chalfont St. Giles,
Bucks, UK). The following thermal profile was used: 42°C
for 30 min; 94°C for 5 min; 35 cycles of 94°C for 60 s;
60°C for 60 s; and 72°C for 90 s; followed by a final exten-
sion of 72°C for 5 min. PCR products were analyzed by
electrophoresis on a 1.5% agarose-Tris-borate-EDTA gel
containing 0.5 µg/mL ethidium bromide. DNA weight
markers (GeneRuler 100 bp DNA Ladder Plus, Ready-To-
Use; Fermentas, Inc., Hanover, MD, USA) were run along-
side the samples to facilitate product identification and
quantification. Post-PCR removal of deoxynucleoside
triphosphates and primers was achieved enzymatically by
using ExoSAP-IT (USB Corporation, Cleveland, OH,
USA), according to the manufacturer’s instructions.
Sequence Determination
PCR amplicons were sequenced by using the DTS
Quick Start Kit (Beckman Coulter Inc., Fullerton, CA,
USA) according to the manufacturer’s instructions and
with the sequencing primers listed in the Table. The
sequencing reactions were run on a CEQ8000Automated
Sequencer (Beckman Coulter) according to the manufac-
turer’s instructions. The sequences determined in this
study have been submitted to the EMBL/GenBank/DDBJ
databases; accession numbers are shown in Appendix 1.
Phylogenetic Analysis
An unrooted neighbor-joining tree was constructed by
using MEGA version 3 (14). The robustness of the tree
topology was assessed with 1,000 bootstrap replicates as
implemented in the program. 
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Virus RNA was extracted from 188 FMD type O virus-
es, and each VP1-coding region was successfully ampli-
fied by RT-PCR by using at least 1 of the 3 described
primer sets. The complete VP1 sequences were determined
by directly sequencing the amplicons. For all these iso-
lates, the VP1 gene consisted of 633 nt coding for 211
amino acids (previously VP1 was considered to be 2 amino
acids longer at its carboxyl-terminus; however, the VP1-
2Acleavage site is actually between a conserved glutamine
[VP1211 in most type Os] and a variable residue [2A1, often
a leucine in serotype O]) (15).
The 188 VP1 sequences we report were compared to
151 VP1 sequences previously published or awaiting pub-
lication (database accession numbers are listed in
Appendix 1). A bootstrapped neighbor-joining tree con-
taining all 339 sequences was constructed by using MEGA
3 (Figure 1). Figures 2–4 show various parts of the tree
depicted in Figure 1 in greater detail. The bootstrap sup-
port for the 10 FMDV O topotypes was generally high
(96%–100%; Figure 2). The topotype distributions of the
299Asian FMD type O viruses (including those reported
elsewhere) were as follows: ME-SA (253), SEA (18), and
Cathay (49) (Appendix 1). Additionally, 26 European
viruses (from the United Kingdom, Ireland, and France)
belonged to the ME-SA topotype. The PanAsia strain
accounted for 168 (66%) of the 253 ME-SA isolates.
Some FMDV O topotypes had a more limited spread
than the ME-SA topotype. Virus isolates from Hong Kong
and the Philippines all fell within the Cathay topotype; all
the recently isolated (2000–2004) Philippines isolates
form a distinct lineage. This topotype was first introduced
into the Philippines in 1994, probably from mainland
China or Hong Kong (the only known places where it
existed at that time). Earlier isolates from the Philippines
(e.g., O/PHI/5/95) were closely related to Hong Kong
viruses (Figure 2). This topotype was first seen in Vietnam
in 1997 and continued to occur there until 2004 (Figure 2)
but has not, as far as we know, spread to neighboring
Southeast Asian countries. A Cathay topotype virus also
spread to Taiwan in 1997, where it caused an extensive
epidemic that lasted until at least 1999 (3) (Figure 2).
Viruses belonging to the SEA topotype continue to be iso-
lated throughout Southeast Asia (Figure 2; online
Appendix 2; available from http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/
EID/vol11no12/05-0908_app2.htm), despite the recent
introduction and widespread dissemination of the PanAsia
strain. No examples of either of the Indonesian topotypes
have been detected in the field since 1983.
Viruses belonging to the ME-SA topotype occur in
many genetic sublineages (Figure 3). These were often ini-
tially found in India and subsequently spread to other geo-
graphic regions. The reference/vaccine strains (O5/IND/1/
62, O1/Manisa/TUR/69, O1/Sharquia/EGY/72, and O/IND/
R2/75) all occur in a single lineage distinct from later iso-
lates. The O5/IND/1/62 sequenced by Hemadri et al. (16)
is different (9.6%) from the same strain that we and others
sequenced (17,18) (all 3 sequences are identical, and the
virus stocks probably all originated from WRLFMD), and
the origin of these isolates requires further investigation.
Two other reference/vaccine strains (O/Geshur/ISR/85 and
O/Dalton/ISR/2/88) fall on another lineage but are not
closely related to each other. Within the ME-SA topotype,
several sublineages have been defined as strains, such as
PanAsia, Ind2001, and Iran2001, on the basis of phyloge-
netic relationships and a nucleotide difference of <5%
(9,16). However, these are artificial groupings, the edges
of which become blurred as viruses evolve in different
directions. For example, the nucleotide sequences of 2
viruses that are on the PanAsia lineage, O/VIT/1/2004 and
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Figure 1. Midpoint–rooted neighbor-joining tree showing the rela-
tionships between the 339 VP1 sequences studied. Only the tree
structure is shown; details of the boxes labeled A to C are shown
in Figures 2–4. 
Foot-and-Mouth Disease Virus Serotype OO/BHU/27/2004, differ from O/TAW/2/99 by 5.4% and
5.0%, respectively, but differ from each other by 7.9%.
Thus trying to define “strains,” particularly using percent-
age nucleotide relationships, may not be relevant, except in
special circumstances, such as a pandemic caused by a
cluster of closely related viruses.
Viruses that we consider part of the PanAsia strain
(within the ME-SA topotype) are shown in Figure 4.
Within the PanAsia strain, different sublineages can be dis-
tinguished despite some low bootstrap values. Some of
them correspond to well-defined geographic areas in
which these isolates have been collected through the years
and show evolutionary relationships. Others are mixtures
of FMDV isolates from different regions. In such cases,
the phylogeny gives clues to the probable source of some
isolates. The PanAsia strain shows a limited degree of vari-
ability of the VP1 gene during the outbreak in 2001 in the
United Kingdom. Indeed, the degree of genetic variability
of the VP1 gene of 24 isolates collected between the begin-
ning and the end of the outbreak was <1.29%, and very
few amino acid changes were observed (a maximum of 3
in any 1 sequence). 
According to our current analysis, the PanAsia strain is
an emergent sublineage of FMDV that, after several years
in India, spread through southern Asia, the Middle East,
and Europe. This strain apparently was confined to India
for longer—and then spread much faster—than previously
believed. In 1994, Samuel et al. (19) first noted the arrival
of a new FMDV type O lineage in Saudi Arabia.
Previously, we had considered this lineage to be part of the
PanAsia strain (13). However, analysis of complete VP1
sequences with the neighbor-joining algorithm, rather than
unweighted pair-group method analysis on partial VP1
sequences, indicated that these viruses, along with others
isolated between 1994 and 1997 in Asia (except India),
actually belong to 1 of 2 distinct lineages that we have
termed Ind2001 and Iran2001 (Figure 3). Therefore, virus-
es that we would now classify as PanAsia first appeared in
Bahrain, Iran, Lebanon, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen
much later (i.e., in 1998); in Israel, Turkey, and the United
Arab Emirates in 1999; and in Malaysia in 2000 (Figures
3 and 4; data not shown). In Nepal in 1990, viruses were
found that were closely related to the earliest PanAsia iso-
lates from India in the same year. However, from 1991 to
1996, only viruses belonging to non-PanAsia lineages of
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Figure 2. Midpoint-rooted neighbor-joining tree showing the
Cathay, Europe-South America (Euro-SA), Indonesia-1 (ISA-1),
Indonesia-2 (ISA-2), West Africa (WA), East Africa 1 (EA-1), East
Africa 2 (EA-2), and East Africa 3 (EA-3) topotypes. Only bootstrap
values >70% are shown.
Figure 3. Midpoint-rooted neighbor-joining tree showing the Middle
East–South Asia (ME-SA) topotype (except the PanAsia strain).
Only bootstrap values >70% are shown.ME-SAwere found in Nepal. During the years 1997–1999,
PanAsia viruses were once again found. This virus lineage
may have persisted in Nepal in the intervening years (since
only a few virus isolates have been examined) or may have
been reintroduced in 1997. This extension and reanalysis
of the sequence data indicate that the spread of the PanAsia
strain from the Indian subcontinent was probably more
explosive than once thought and principally occurred from
1998 to 2001.
Retrospective examination of viruses from India indi-
cated that the PanAsia strain was present in the north of
that country as early as 1990 and may even have been pres-
ent as far back as 1982 (16). From 1991 to 1997, the new
lineage appeared to spread to other parts of India (16).
The presumed initial spread from India in 1998 was to
Bhutan, Bahrain, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Syria,
Saudi Arabia, and the Yemen Arab Republic. In May 1999,
the People’s Republic of China reported FMD outbreaks in
Tibet, Hainan, and Fujian Provinces (20). Sequencing
viruses from the outbreaks in Tibet (O/CHA/1/99,
O/CHA/2/99, and O/CHA/3/99) and Hainan (O/CHA/
4/99) showed that they belonged to the new lineage (13)
(Figure 4). In June 1999, FMDV was isolated from sub-
clinically infected or carrier cattle in Kinmen Prefecture of
Taiwan Province of China (POC) during routine surveil-
lance. Sequence analysis of this isolate (O/TAW/2/99)
showed it also belonged to the new lineage (Figure 4).
Later that month, FMDV was detected in Tainan
Prefecture on the main island of Taiwan, again in cattle
showing no signs of disease. In January 2000, the first clin-
ical cases in cattle were found in Taiwan (Yunlin and
Chiayii Prefectures) and in February 2000, ≈71 young
goats in Kaoshiung and Changhwa Prefectures died sud-
denly from FMD, although no disease was seen in adult
goats that had been vaccinated. The distribution of this
sublineage throughout Asia justified its name of the
PanAsia strain.
Towards the end of 1999, the PanAsia virus was clear-
ly moving into Southeast Asia (Myanmar, Thailand,
Vietnam, Lao People’s Democratic Republic) (Appendix
2), where the FMDV type O SEA topotype had existed
exclusively (at least until the Cathay topotype was intro-
duced into Vietnam in 1997) (10). By April 2000, all main-
land Southeast Asian countries had experienced outbreaks
due to the new strain.
In March 2000, FMD type O appeared in South Korea
and Japan, and sequence analysis indicated that the
PanAsia strain was responsible (13) (Figure 4). In April
2000, a severe outbreak of FMD type O in occurred in pigs
in the Ussuriysk District of eastern Russia. Of 625 pigs
affected, nearly 37% died from the disease. Sequencing the
VP1 gene showed that the PanAsia strain was responsible
(13). At the end of April 2000, an outbreak of FMD type O
was reported in Ulaanbadrakh Soum County, Dornogovi
Province, Mongolia. In this outbreak sheep, goats, and cat-
tle were affected. Again, sequence analysis of the VP1
gene showed the virus to be of the PanAsia lineage (13). In
September 2000, the PanAsia strain spread to KwaZulu-
Natal Province in South Africa (13,17) (Figure 4); the ori-
gin was traced to feeding pigs with uncooked swill from a
ship in the port of Durban (21). This FMD outbreak is the
first since 1957 in this region of South Africa and the first
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Figure 4. Midpoint-rooted neighbor-joining tree showing the
PanAsia strain. Only bootstrap values >70% are shown.
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recorded outbreak in that country due to serotype O. In
February 2001, FMD was diagnosed in the United
Kingdom; by the end of July, >1,900 farms were affected.
The PanAsia strain was responsible for these outbreaks
(13,22,23). In late February 2001, the disease spread from
the British mainland to Northern Ireland, and in March and
April outbreaks of FMD type O were also reported in the
Republic of Ireland (n = 1), France (n = 2), and the
Netherlands (n = 26). In 2003, the PanAsia strain was
detected for the first time in Afghanistan, Nepal, and
Pakistan; however, because of lack of samples or sequenc-
ing data, the strain may have been present earlier. Since
2003, the PanAsia strain has not been detected in any new
countries.
The PanAsia strain has not yet been detected in Africa
(except South Africa in 2000) or South America, despite
extensive unpublished sequence studies by ourselves; the
Onderstepoort Veterinary Institute, South Africa (W.
Vosloo, pers. comm.); and the Pan-American FMD Center,
Brazil (I.E. Bergmann, pers. comm.). However, the
PanAsia strain is present in many countries in which FMD
is endemic and occurs in countries in which the incidence
of FMD is sporadic. 
The extent of this spread is unique for a single strain of
FMDV, and its presence in most recent samples from the
Middle East indicates that it has dominated and outcom-
peted the other strains of FMDV previously observed (19).
While we acknowledge that the sampling of virus isolates
is not random (i.e., the samples examined are those sub-
mitted to WRLFMD by some of the countries experienc-
ing outbreaks), the same sampling technique has shown a
marked increase in the number of isolations of the PanAsia
lineage over the preceding years. 
The appearance of the PanAsia virus in countries that
have been FMD-free for many years shows that this strain
is capable of spreading to countries where strict control
measures are normally effective at preventing importation
of animal pathogens. Whether this fitness to survive is
related to particular features of the transmissibility of the
virus strain or its ability to spread subclinically in certain
breeds of animal, as found in Taiwan in 1999 or in Japan in
2000 (24), is not clear. The PanAsia virus strain has been
isolated from a wide variety of host species, including cat-
tle, water buffalo, pigs, sheep, goats, and gazelle (Qatar in
1999), and its ability to infect a wide range of species could
be a contributing factor in its success. Within the PanAsia
strain, differences in behavior of the virus, such as host
species or virulence, remain unexplained on a genetic basis,
according to comparison of the full genome sequences from
viruses from this group (25). However, these characteristics
can also be biased by practices such as vaccination, the ani-
mal population targeted for vaccination, or the animal
species that are farmed in a particular area.
We have no evidence of increased or altered trade in the
region that could explain the sudden spread of the PanAsia
virus. Additionally, the lack of efficacy of existing FMDV
vaccines does not seem to be responsible for the spread of
this strain in countries in which vaccination is practiced.
Indeed, antigenic matching analysis has shown good cross-
reactivity between field isolates of the PanAsia strain and
current vaccine strains such as O1 Manisa (WRLFMD, data
not shown), and this finding has been confirmed for
O/UKG/2001 virus by cross-protection studies (26,27).
The spread of the PanAsia strain across most of Asia
and into Europe and South Africa demonstrates how a
newly evolved virus may become established, in spite of
control measures at international borders. FMD in a previ-
ously disease-free country can seriously interfere with the
local and export trade in susceptible animals and their
products. A large outbreak of FMD in northern Europe or
the United States could result in losses of several billion
US dollars. The emergence of this strain of FMDV, and its
spread within the territory bounded by Ireland in the west
and Japan in the east, provides an example of the econom-
ic damage that can result. It also demonstrates the difficul-
ty of containing such a transmissible virus within a defined
region. The emergence of such strains highlights the neces-
sity to constantly monitor and characterize field isolates
responsible for outbreaks in FMD-endemic countries and
the need for countries to be rapidly alerted so that appro-
priate control measures can be instituted. For this purpose,
an international early warning system must be established
to share information on the characteristics of the latest
FMDV isolates in real time.
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